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- (i) Relevant peak historic price volatilities;
- (ii) Shifts in other market factors including, as appropriate, price determinants and yield curves;
- (iii) Multiple defaults over various time horizons:
- (iv) Simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets; and
- (v) A range of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions.
- (5) For the scenarios enumerated in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, consider the following:
- (i) All entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the systemically important derivatives clearing organization or subpart C derivatives clearing organization, including settlement banks, permitted depositories, liquidity providers, and other entities,
- (ii) Multiday scenarios as appropriate,
- (iii) Inter-linkages between its clearing members and the multiple roles that they may play in the systemically important derivatives clearing organization's or subpart C derivatives clearing organization's risk management; and
- (iv) The probability of multiple failures and contagion effect among clearing members.
 - (6) Establish procedures for:
- (i) Reporting stress test results to its risk management committee or board of directors, as applicable; and
- (ii) Using the results to assess the adequacy of, and to adjust its total amount of liquidity resources.
- (7) Use the results of stress tests to support compliance with the liquidity resources requirement set forth in \$39.33(c).
- (d) Each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization shall regularly conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its margin model for all products it clears.
- (e) Each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization shall perform, on an annual basis, a full validation of its financial risk management model and its liquidity risk management model.

- (f) Custody and investment risk. Custody and investment arrangements of a systemically important derivatives clearing organization's and subpart C derivatives clearing organization's own funds and assets shall be subject to the same requirements as those specified in §39.15 for the funds and assets of clearing members, and shall apply to the derivatives clearing organization's own funds and assets to the same extent as if such funds and assets belonged to clearing members.
- (g) Settlement banks. Each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization shall:
- (1) Monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from its settlement banks;
- (2) Establish, and monitor adherence to, strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalization, access to liquidity, and operational reliability; and
- (3) Monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its settlement banks.

§ 39.37 Additional disclosure for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.

In addition to the requirements of §39.21, each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization shall:

- (a) Complete and publicly disclose its responses to the Disclosure Framework for Financial Market Infrastructures published by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions;
- (b) Review and update its responses disclosed as required by paragraph (a) of this section at least every two years and following material changes to the systemically important derivatives clearing organization's or subpart C derivatives clearing organization's system or the environment in which it operates. A material change to the systemically important derivatives clearing organization's or subpart C derivatives clearing organization's system or

the environment in which it operates is a change that would significantly change the accuracy and usefulness of the existing responses;

- (c) Disclose, publicly and to the Commission, relevant basic data on transaction volume and values; and
- (d) Disclose, publicly and to the Commission, rules, policies, and procedures concerning segregation and portability of customers' positions and funds, including whether each of:
- Futures customer funds, as defined in §1.3(jjjj) of this chapter;
- (2) Cleared Swaps Customer Collateral, as defined in §22.1 of this chapter; or
- (3) Foreign futures or foreign options secured amount, as defined in §1.3(rr) of this chapter is:
- (i) Protected on an individual or omnibus basis or
- (ii) Subject to any constraints, including any legal or operational constraints that may impair the ability of the systemically important derivatives clearing organization or subpart C derivatives clearing organization to segregate or transfer the positions and related collateral of a clearing member's customers.

§ 39.38 Efficiency for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.

- (a) General rule. In order to meet the needs of clearing members and markets, each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization should efficiently and effectively design its:
- (1) Clearing and settlement arrangements:
- (2) Operating structure and procedures;
 - (3) Scope of products cleared; and
 - (4) Use of technology.
- (b) Review of efficiency. Each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization should establish a mechanism to review, on a regular basis, its compliance with paragraph (a) of this section.
- (c) Clear goals and objectives. Each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization should

have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, including in the areas of minimum service levels, risk management expectations, and business priorities.

(d) Each systemically important derivatives clearing organization and subpart C derivatives clearing organization shall facilitate efficient payment, clearing and settlement by accommodating internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.

§ 39.39 Recovery and wind-down for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C derivatives clearing organizations.

- (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
- (1) General business risk means any potential impairment of a systemically important derivatives clearing organization's or subpart C derivatives clearing organization's financial position, as a business concern, as a consequence of a decline in its revenues or an increase in its expenses, such that expenses exceed revenues and result in a loss that the derivatives clearing organization must charge against capital.
- (2) Wind-down means the actions of a systemically important derivatives clearing organization or subpart C derivatives clearing organization to effect the permanent cessation or sale or transfer or one or more services.
- (3) Recovery means the actions of a systemically important derivatives clearing organization or subpart C derivatives clearing organization, consistent with its rules, procedures, and other ex-ante contractual arrangements, to address any uncovered credit loss, liquidity shortfall, capital inadequacy, or business, operational or other structural weakness, including the replenishment of any depleted prefunded financial resources and liquidity arrangements, as necessary to maintain the systemically important derivatives clearing organization's or subpart C derivatives clearing organization's viability as a going concern.
- (4) Operational risk means the risk that deficiencies in information systems or internal processes, human errors, management failures or disruptions from external events will result